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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of corporate scandal, regulators worldwide responded with
new mandates and reforms in an effort to reinstate trust and certainty in the
marketplace.  Those reforms are now challenged by the current credit
in the United States and Australia, including an analysis of the climate
for Directors & Officers (D & O) liability coverage.  Comparing these 
regulations across two large markets with similar historical bases for
assessing director and officer liability allows us to explore which reforms 
may be more effective as new scandals emerge.
crisis.  This article compares the modern corporate regulatory environments
In the United States, corporate governance laws have evolved gradually 
since the 1950s,1 but 2002 brought the most dramatic change with the 
1. See ABA Committee on Corporate Compliance, Corporate Compliance 
Survey, 60 BUS. LAW. 1759, 1760 (2005); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, 
Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes 
of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1578 (1990); John D. Copeland, The Tyson Story:
Building an Effective Ethics and Compliance Program, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 305, 311 
(2000); Charles J. Walsh & Alisa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense 
to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 650
(1995). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act.2  Similarly, in Australia, corporate law has evolved 
gradually over the last several decades with recent updates in response
to managerial wrongdoing.3  Now, the global economic downturn
has brought new scandal to both markets.  Given that both governments 
drafted their regulatory reforms in the context of multiple scandals that
demolished investor confidence, a comparison between the two systems’
corporate governance programs4 should inform future outcomes and help
determine which system better accomplishes its desired goals. 
We begin in Section II by describing the corporate scandals that
spawned new legislation in order to illustrate the context in which each
government drafted their respective reforms.  In Section III, we evaluate 
these reforms for similarities and differences.  In Section IV we analyze
how each country’s regulatory schemes may impact D & O liability.
Finally, we conclude by exploring what the future may hold for American
and Australian corporate governance in light of the current credit crisis 
and beyond.
II. MODERN CORPORATE SCANDALS IN THE  
UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
A. Current Credit Crisis
1. The United States 
While many of the scandals at the end of the 1990s involved
accounting improprieties, the current crisis stems from distortions in the 
real estate market.  After the bursting of the technology bubble, a new 
bubble developed in residential real estate in the United States.5  The  
explosion in home prices was partly driven by the securitization of home 
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX]. 
3. See Roman Tomasic, The Modernisation of Corporations Law: Corporate Law
Reform in Australia and Beyond, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 2, 60 (2006). 
4. See HarrisBeach.com, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—Legal Alert, Aug.
2002, http://www.harrisbeach.com/news/articleviewer.cfm?aid=175; Larelle Chapple &
Boyce Koh, Regulatory Responses to Auditor Independence Dilemmas—Who takes the 
Stronger Line, 21 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 6 (2007). 
5. Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, Credit Time Bomb Ticked, but Few Heard, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at A1. 
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mortgages.6  Securitization is a process which involves pooling income 
streams or receivables, such as payments on a mortgage, and selling 
securities backed by those payments.7  In a typical transaction, the lender, 
commonly referred to as an originator in securitization parlance, assigns 
a loan to a subsidiary of an investment bank.8  In exchange for the
receivable, the originator receives a lump sum payment.9  The subsidiary, 
in turn, combines that loan with hundreds of other loans in a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV).10  The SPV then sells securities backed by payments
on the underlying mortgages.11  These securities resemble other debt 
instruments and are typically traded among large, institutional investors.12 
Although the process existed for some time, the securitization of
mortgages gained new prominence as investment banks reaped huge
profits by packaging home mortgages into securities and selling them to
investors with a seemingly endless appetite.13 Banks sold these 
securities to all parts of the financial system, including insurance 
companies, hedge funds, and other foreign investors.14  Additionally, 
many American investment banks that manufactured these securities 
held these assets on their books.15 
While a full recounting of the ensuing crisis is beyond the scope of 
this article, the market for mortgage-backed securities simply suffered a 
systemic failure.  Beginning in 2007, the national housing market experienced
dramatic turmoil.16  At the center of the storm were subprime mortgages— 
loans made to individuals with poor credit or little credit history.17 
Rising defaults from subprime borrowers and questions about the ability
of other borrowers to repay their loans raised questions about the value
6. Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, The Financial Crisis Blame Game, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 10, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/ 
oct2008/pi20081017_950382.htm. 
7. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2185, 2186–87 (2007); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured 
Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595, 599–600 (1998). 
8. Peterson, supra note 7, at 2209; Lupica, supra note 7, at 600. 
9. Lupica, supra note 7, at 600. 
10. Peterson, supra note 7, at 2209. 
11. Id. 
12. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of 
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 80 (2008). 
13. Id.
 14. Peterson, supra note 7, at 2188. 
15. Edmund L. Andrews, Troubled Assets Still on Books Could Pose Risk, Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at B2. 
16. Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, supra note 5. 
17. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law 
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2002). 
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of the securities held throughout Wall Street.  Furthermore, fraudulent 
practices by some in the mortgage industry meant that some borrowers 
took on mortgages that they had no ability to repay.18  Together, these
factors lead to a steep decline in the value of these mortgage-backed
securities.19 Because investment banks used the mortgage-backed 
securities as collateral for loans to take on additional risk, many suffered
a classic “run on the bank” from their creditors and trading partners.20 
2. Australia 
Although the mortgage-backed securities crisis originated on Wall
Street, the effects of the crisis have spread throughout the global 
financial system.  Financial institutions of all shapes and sizes, including 
those in Australia, purchased these securities of diminishing value.21  In
addition, the machinery of securitization around the world ground to a 
halt, preventing companies from raising new funds or rolling over existing
debt.22  Australian financial institutions, like their American counterparts, 
were unable to use securitization to make new home loans.23 
18. See generally Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the
Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557 (2009) (examining the causes 
of the credit crisis and focusing on the overextension of consumer credit in the 
residential real estate market).
19. See The Economic Outlook: Testimony Before the J. Econ. Comm., 110th 
Cong. (2008) (testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080402a.htm (noting that
“large financial institutions . . . have reported substantial losses and writedowns” of 
mortgage-backed securities).
20. See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., Run on Big Wall Street Bank Spurs Rescue 
Backed by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/
business/15bear.html (describing the run on Bear Stearns); see also SEC OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ACCOUNTANT DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008:
STUDY ON MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING in Lizabeth Ann R. Eisen, Securities 
Offerings 2009: What Counsel Need to Know to Get Deals Done in Challenging Markets, 
1734 PLI/CORP 283, 297 (Apr. 23–24, 2009) (claiming that the credit crisis was triggered
by “a ‘run on the bank’ at certain institutions”).
21. See generally Berkely Cox & Jeremy Green, Securitisation in Australia in
GLOBAL SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 2008, available at http://www.global
securitisation.com/08_GBP/GBP_GSSF08_091_098_Australia.pdf. 
22. RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN SECURITIZATION MARKETS, SEC. INDUSTRY FIN.
MARKET ASS’N, Dec. 3, 2008, at 6, available athttp://www.sifma.org/capital_markets/ 
docs/Survey- Restoring-confidence-securitization-markets.pdf. 
23. Wietske Blees, Grinding to a Halt, RISK MAG., Sept. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.risk.net/public/showPage.html?page=814352. 
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B. Accounting Scandal & Sarbanes-Oxley 
1. The United States 
Before the current credit crisis however, the U.S. had a series of 
striking scandals so impactful that they lead to the overhaul in corporate 
governance regulation that we now know as Sarbanes-Oxley, commonly 
referred to as SOX.  Sarbanes Oxley was a major piece of legislation 
passed in 2002 and named for sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes and
Representative Michael Oxley. Although a full review of Sarbanes Oxley
is beyond the scope of this article, it made significant changes to the 
accounting practices of public companies.  Among other matters, SOX 
impacts the relationship between auditors and public companies,24 and 
corporate governance practices that touch on financial reports and
internal controls.25  SOX also establishes stiff penalties for violations of
its provisions.26 
The “line leader” in the accounting scandals that produced SOX was 
Enron, formerly one of the largest international traders of electricity and 
natural gas.27 The Enron scandal emerged from a deadly combination of 
unsuccessful partnerships that produced excessive debt, which, in turn, 
led to misleading financial reporting.28  As the company fell apart, stock 
prices plummeted, creating a downward spiral.29  Eventually, Enron filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The misleading statements and fraudulent 
acts did not stop at Enron’s boardroom, but encompassed their
accounting firms as well.  Arthur Andersen, one of the biggest 
accounting firms, was to ensure that investors could rely on Enron’s 
financial statements.30  On June 15, 2002, however, the government 
convicted Arthur Andersen of obstruction of justice for its involvement
with Enron, including the shredding of pertinent documents.  Arthur 
24. SOX, supra note 2, § 203. 
25. SOX, supra note 2, § 301. 
26. SOX, supra note 2, § 802. 
27. Timeline of Enron’s Collapse, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2002, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A25624-2002Jan 
10&notFound=true.  Enron evidenced its undiscriminating approach to canvassing politics by
hiring Linda Robertson, formerly with the Clinton administration, to head its Washington 
office as Vice President for Federal Government affairs exactly one month following Lay’s 
personal contribution to Bush’s campaign.  See also Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Lucy Shackelford, 
Understanding Enron, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/enron/
front.html.
28. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Lucy Shackelford supra note 27. 
29. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose 
Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2002). 
30. See O’Harrow & Shackelford, supra note 27. 
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Andersen was the first accounting firm ever to be convicted of a
felony.31 
As fraud and corruption involving Enron and its accounting firm
surfaced, on July 21, 2002, WorldCom, a leading international 
communications network, took Enron’s title as the largest Chapter 11 
bankruptcy filing in history.32  Enron and WorldCom had in common an
unfortunate effort by officers to conceal and misstate financial 
information to make profits appear larger.  Enron executives accomplished
this fraud by utilizing off-balance sheet transactions to shift debt off of 
the books through various fraudulent partnerships and then shredding 
incriminating documents with the assistance of Arthur Andersen.33 The
methodology utilized by WorldCom was far more basic, but no less 
fraudulent. Worldcom’s executives—Bernard Ebbers, Scott Sullivan, 
and others—inflated earnings in two ways. First, by capitalizing
expenditures on the balance sheet that should have been recorded as 
expenses on the income statement, they deferred expenses and inflated
net income.34  Second, typically after the end of each quarter and just
before their audit or review, they booked large entries to record revenue
that had never been earned.35  The executives frequently reassured the
public that the company’s impressive growth rate was sustainable, but, 
as it turns out, those growth rates were sustained only by increasingly
overinflated revenue.36 
Before the public could recover from the news of these frauds, Tyco, a
maker of equipment for various industries (including electrical, fire and
security, healthcare, and telecommunications), became embroiled in a
similar scandal involving financial misstatements and a blatant misuse of 
corporate funds. On September 12, 2002, the government indicted
31. N. Craig Smith & Michelle Quirk, From Grace to Disgrace: the Rise & Fall of 
Arthur Anderson, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS EDUC. 91, 91 (2004).  However, the conviction of
Arthur Anderson was later overturned due to a finding of error in the jury instructions. 
Bill Mears, Arthur Andersen Conviction Overturned, CNN, May 31, 2005, http://www.
cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/31/scotus.arthur.andersen/. 
32. WorldCom Company Timeline, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49156-2002Jun26_3.html. 
33. O’Harrow & Shackelford, supra note 27. 
34. Dennis R. Beresford, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, & C.B. Rogers, Jr., Report of
Investigation, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
WORLDCOM, INC. at 11, Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/723527/000093176303001862/dex991.htm#ex991902_2. 
35. Id. at 13–15. 
36. Id. at 13. 
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former Tyco CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, and CFO, Mark Swartz, for selling 
stock at artificially inflated prices, as well as taking $170 million for 
personal use through improper bonuses and forgiven company loans.37 
Similarly, executives from Adelphia Communications Corp., a cable
TV operator, and ImClone, the maker of a cancer drug, both suffered the 
same fate. Adelphia’s founder, John Rigas, and his family spent over $1 
billion for personal expenses.38  ImClone Chairman, Sam Waksal, and 
his family and friends sold millions of dollars of stock immediately 
before the FDA announced it would not approve the company’s cancer 
drug.39  Eventually, the ImClone scandal ensnared Martha Stewart, who 
sold 3,000 shares of ImClone stock immediately prior to the FDA 
disclosure.40 
In addition to financial malfeasance at some of America’s largest
companies, many major investment banking firms put their own profits 
ahead of their clients’ interests.41  For example, several investment banks 
issued positive research reports on companies to win investment banking 
business while privately telling favored clients that the companies were
not on solid footing. Because of these practices, on May 21, 2002, the 
New York Attorney General, in association with the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), forced Merrill Lynch to agree to a series of penalties 
for misleading investors.42  These penalties included structural reform, 
production of a statement of contrition, and payment of a $100 million 
fine.43  Salomon Smith Barney, like Merrill Lynch, has also misled its clients 
and the larger investing public.44 The National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) found that Salomon Smith Barney issued misleading 
37. Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged With $600 Million
Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A1, available at http://query.nytimes. 
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B00E0DF1131F930A2575AC0A9649C8B63. Tyco,
as a corporation, was not charged because the wrongdoing was limited to specific 
officers within Tyco. Id.
38. Ex-ImClone Boss Charged with Fraud, BBC NEWS, June 12, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2041385.stm [hereinafter Imclone Fraud]; Jurors Begin 
Deliberations in Adelphia Fraud Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at C2, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E1DF1538F93AA15755
C0A9629C8B63. 
39. See Imclone Fraud, supra note 38. 
40. Id.
41. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony
Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement Before the Senate Committee on Banking,




44. Salomon Pays the NASD Piper, FORBES.COM, Sept. 23, 2002, http://www. 
forbes.com/2002/09/23/0923grubman.html. 
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research reports on Winstar Communications and levied a $5 million 
fine.45  Ultimately, ten Wall Street firms, including some of the
most venerable names in American finance, agreed to $875 million 
in disgorgement and civil penalties.46 
2. Australia 
The United States was not alone in its corporate failures.  In the first 
half of 2001, Australia saw HIH Insurance, One.Tel, and Harris-Scarfe
fall.47  Like their American counterparts, these scandals involved inadequate
disclosures and accounting problems.48 
HIH Insurance was founded in 1968 and went public in 1992.49  HIH
comprised several separate government–licensed insurance companies, 
including HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited, FAI General
Insurance Company Limited (FAI), CIC Insurance Limited (CIC), and 
World Marine and General Insurances Limited (WMG).50  HIH wrote 
many types of insurance policies in Australia, the USA, and the UK.  In 
Australia, HIH’s practice included compulsory insurance (such as workers’
compensation and compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance) and 
non–compulsory insurance (such as home contents and travel insurance).51 
As early as 1992, HIH’s accounting practices drew questionable 
attention. On June 4, 1992, British insurance broker CE Heath wrote off 
45% of its under–performing subsidiary—CE Heath International 
45. Id.
46. SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last visited May 5, 2009). 
47. Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 367 (2005); Paul von Nessen, Corporate Governance in Australia: Converging
with International Developments, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003); Bonnie Buchanan, 
Australian Corporate Casualties, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ADVANCES IN FINANCIAL 
ECONOMICS 55, 55 (2004). 
48. See Buchanan, supra note 47. 
49. The full corporate history of HIH can be found in HIH Royal Commission.
Neville Owen, REPORT OF THE HIH ROYAL COMMISSION, Commonwealth of Australia, 
pt. 2, ch. 3 (2003), available at http://hihroyalcom.gov.au/ (HIH Royal Commission). 
50. David Kehl, HIH Insurance Group Collapses, Nov. 29, 2001, http://www. 
aph.gov.au/library/intguide/econ/hih_insurance.htm.  See also Gregor Allan, The HIH
Collapse: A Costly Catalyst for Reform, 11 DEAKIN L. REV. 137 (2006) and Jean du 
Plessis, Reverberations After the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate Collapses:
The Role of ASIC, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 225 (2003). 
51. Kehl, supra note 50. 
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Holdings Ltd.—a precursor to HIH, on the stock exchange.52 A due 
diligence report prepared by Ernst and Young regarding the merger found 
there was not a “prudential margin,” but the merger proceeded nonetheless.53 
Insurers frequently incorporate a “prudential margin” when calculating a 
provision for outstanding claims so that the provisions exceed the central
estimate of such claims, or the mean of the distribution of possible
outcomes based on historical claims.  Such a cautious approach was not
followed by HIH, resulting in harsh criticism by the Royal Commission.54 
The ultimate nail in the coffin for HIH, however, came in 1998 when
HIH began a formal takeover of FAI Insurance Ltd.55  HIH completed 
the takeover in January 1999.56  However, early 1999 marked records for
natural disasters, declining premiums, and low interest rates, resulting in 
a profit decline for HIH of 39%.57 Losses mounted and share prices 
dropped. In 2000, the news worsened as questions of failure to disclose 
information to shareholders arose.58  By September of 2000, regulators
suspended trading of HIH shares. Trading was suspended again in 
February 2001 as Standard and Poors dropped HIH’s credit rating and 
losses continued to skyrocket.59  By March 2001, HIH was in liquidation
and an investigation was launched by May 2001.60 
At almost the same time, in April of 2001, Harris-Scarfe, Australia’s
third largest retail group, collapsed.61 At the time of its liquidation, it had 
been in operation for 150 years.62 The story sounds remarkably familiar, 
with allegations of overstated profits and false financial statements.63 
Harris-Scarfe’s losses set records, including a debt of $65 million
(Australian) to ANZ bank.64 
52. Id.
53. See Buchanan, supra note 47. 
 54. Deborah DeMott, Inside the Corporate Veil:  The Character and Consequences of
Executives’ Duties, NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository, at 14, available at http://lsr.
nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=duke_fs (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
55. See id.
 56. Kehl, supra note 50. 
57. Buchanan, supra note 47. 
58. Id.
59. Id.
 60. Kehl, supra note 50. 
61. Buchanan, supra note 47, at 61. 
62. Philomena Leung & Barry J. Cooper, The Mad Hatter’s Corporate Tea Party, 
18 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 505 (2003). 
63. Id.
 64. Buchanan, supra note 47. For a recent discussion of the effect of this failure 
and claims made against the D & O insurance of directors, see Debra Lane, Court 
Appoints Liquidators to Enable Claims Under D & O Policy, 22 AUSTL. INS. L. BULL.
126 (2007). 
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Last but not least, One.Tel, an Australian telecommunications company, 
went into liquidation in May 2001.65  One.Tel apparently suffered similar 
industry problems as seen during the same period in the U.S. and
Europe.66  As industry pressures created cash problems, One.Tel
engaged in insolvent trading, insider trading, and market disclosure
failures.67  In addition, at a time when One.Tel experienced A$290 
million in losses, its executives received bonuses of A$7 million.68  At  
the time of its collapse, One.Tel had approximately A$600 million in
liabilities.69 
These scandals were remarkable on many levels, including their 
simultaneous occurrence, how they manifested worldwide, the extent of 
their fraud, and how they reflect an apparent lack of concern for 
governance.  Unfortunately, these scandals also shared a common
outcome—severe damage to investor confidence.70 
III. COMPARATIVE REGULATION
A. The United States
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002,71 declaring, “[n]o more easy money for corporate criminals; 
just hard time.”72  The bill raced through Congress.  Sarbanes-Oxley 
criminalized certain behaviors that had not previously been criminal and 
65. See Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability across 
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1440 (2006) (discussing the prosecutions which arose 
from this collapse).  See also Michael De Martinis, Do Directors, Regulators, and 
Auditors Speak, Hear, and See No Evil? Evidence from the Enron, HIH, and One.Tel 
Collapses, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 66 (2002). 
66. Buchanan, supra note 47. 
67. Leung & Cooper, supra note 62. 
68. Id.
 69. Buchanan, supra note 47. See also ASIC v. Rich (2003) 174 F.L.R. 128; Tanya
Josev, Tailoring Directors’ Duties to ‘Contemporary Community Expectations’: New 
Directions for the Courts Post-ASIC v Rich, 22 CORP. & SEC. L.J. 553 (2004). 
70. Jerry Knight, No Market Rebound Until Companies Come Clean, WASH. POST, 
June 17, 2002, at E1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?page 
name=article&node=&contentId=A61568-2002Jun16&notFound=true (stating the damage is
demonstrated by the fact that “the economy has grown less than 3 percent in the past year, its
most anemic expansion in four decades”).
71. SOX, supra note 2. 
72. President Bush Signs Corporate Corruption Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1319–22 (July
30, 2002). 
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significantly increased the penalties for existing crimes.73  The statute 
imposes additional requirements that were intended to increase corporate 
compliance with legal and ethical standards. 74  It also requires issuers of
securities to disclose in periodic reports whether they have adopted a 
code of ethics for senior financial officers, and if not, to explain why.75 
According to the Act, any amendments and waivers to the company’s 
code of ethics must be immediately disclosed in a public filing.76 
In addition, the Act directs national securities exchanges to prohibit 
the listing of company securities where the audit committee has not 
established procedures for the receipt, retention, and treatment of 
complaints regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing 
matters.77  In adopting the regulations, the SEC made clear that it was 
not mandating specific requirements for reporting procedures, but companies 
were instead being provided with the flexibility to develop procedures 
appropriate to their circumstances.78 
The statute responds directly to the multitude of scandals by including 
provisions to criminalize specific wrongdoings, as well as vastly increasing 
penalties to deter future corporate misconduct.  It creates personal 
accountability for the corporations’ directors and officers with almost no 
forgiveness for failures to be accurate and transparent.  Overall, 
the Act’s provisions, in concert with mandates to regulators, strive to 
restore the integrity of the marketplace.
B. Australia 
The reform of Australian corporation law has been a work in progress
over the last two decades.79 However, major corporate collapses in 
Australia of HIH, Harris-Scarfe, and One.Tel resulted in legislative 
proposals for corporate governance standards.80  In Australia, Sarbanes-
Oxley has, to a degree, also served as a model for change.81
 73. Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New
Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 572–73 (2004). 
74. See Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate Compliance in 
the United States: A Brief Overview, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP





 79. Tomasic, supra note 3.
 80. von Nessen, supra note 47. 
81. Id.
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After the quick passage of SOX, the Chairman of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) proposed that the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) impose more rigorous corporate governance 
standards.82  In response, the ASX introduced a set of guidelines, the ASX
Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good Corporate Governance
and Best Practice Recommendations.83  The ASX Principles provide a 
comprehensive guide to best corporate governance practice, including
several initiatives similar in substance to those introduced by SOX.84 
Further, a lack of audit independence and inaccurate reporting contributed 
to the financial collapses in Australia.85  Much like the United States,
Australia responded by passing reforms entitled, “Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004
(CLERP 9).”86  CLERP 9 aims to rebuild the integrity of the audit system 
by emphasizing and assuring auditor independence.87 
C. Comparisons Between Australian and American 
Corporate Governance Reform 
Despite some notable differences between the United States and 
Australian reforms, they are substantially similar regarding both the 
underlying motivations for enactment and the goals that the regulations 
are intended to meet.
While the overall goals of transparency, accountability and accuracy 
are the same, the implementation is somewhat different. The United 
States has channeled all of its reforms into Sarbanes-Oxley.  There is no
82. Id.
83. ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and
Recommendations (2d ed.), Aug. 2007, http://asx.ice4.interactiveinvestor.com.au/ASX0701/ 
Corporate%20Governance%20Principles/EN/body.aspx?z=1&p=-1&v=1&uid= [hereinafter
ASX Recommendations]; see also Hill, supra note 47, at 378. 
84. von Nessen, supra note 47. 
85. Id.
86. Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004, No. 103 (2004), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/
Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/66B0C93ECDA86C21CA256F720011722E?OpenDocum
ent [hereinafter CLERP 9]. 
87. Id.; see also Chapple & Koh, supra note 4, at 6 (2007). The Australian 
proposals, like those in the United States, identify risks to independence caused by an 
audit firm’s performance of non-audit functions and by the hiring by the firm of former
auditors.  As in the United States, mechanisms to safeguard auditor independence include an
independent audit committee and rotation of audit staff.
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single statute like SOX that regulates corporate governance issues in
Australia.  Instead, Australia retained a disclosure model with some 
legislative requirements found in CLERP 9,88 supplemented by exchange 
listing rules89 that implement corporate governance principles.90 The
ASX Principles adopt a “comply or explain” model, whereby companies 
listed on the ASX must comply with, or explain their divergence from,
these principles in their annual report.91  If the ASX is not satisfied with 
an explanation, or believes a flagrant breach occurred, they will refer the 
matter to the ASIC.92  Thus, the U.S. has put most of its corporate reform
eggs in one legislative basket with some assistance from regulatory and 
exchange listing standards. Australia, on the other hand, has some eggs
in the legislative basket, but placed many more in the baskets of
regulators and exchanges. 
Implementation aside, the substance of the regulations bears substantial 
similarities.  Both countries’ new corporate governance regimes contain 
reforms relating to director independence, board committees, executive 
compensation, internal controls and ethics, disclosure, related 
party transactions, enforcement, and auditor independence, though the 
intricacies of those reforms are not always congruous.93  Just as SOX 
directly responded to specific issues relating to the collapse of Enron and
other companies, CLERP 9 bears many hallmarks of the HIH collapse 
and other scandals.94 
1. Boards, Committees, and Directors 
Given the Board of Director’s role as the body that ultimately oversees
the company, several of the reforms in Australia and the United States 
have focused on how the board functions.  Specifically, the reforms have 
addressed the makeup of the entire board, the audit committee, and the 
compensation committee.  In the United States, the listing requirements 
of the major stock exchanges, NYSE and NASDAQ, require that a
majority of the board be made up of independent directors.95  The listing 
88. CLERP 9, supra note 86. 
 89. ASX, Listing Rules, http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/rules_guidance/listing_ 
rules1.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
90. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83. 
91. See Hill supra note 47, at 378. 
92. Id.; see also Corporations Act, 2001, § 777 (Austl.). 
93. See infra pt. II.C.(i)–(vii). 
94. Hill, supra note 47, at 373 (2005). 
95. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.01 (2009), available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/listed
/1182508124422.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html [hereinafter NYSE Manual]; 
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requirements also define independence with great detail.96 At a 
minimum, a director is not independent if she is, or, within the last three 
years, has been, an executive officer or employee of the company. 
Additionally, the individuals may not have any material relationship
with the corporation. This includes both commercial and professional
relationships.  A director is not independent if an immediate family member 
falls into any of the described circumstances.  The listing rules also contain 
detailed requirements relating to interlocking board memberships. 
Similarly, the Australian Securities Exchange recommends that a majority
of the board be made up of independent directors.97  As explained above,
Australia, like the UK, has adopted the lighter touch regulatory model 
(“comply or explain”) rather than the direct legislative requirement
model adopted by SOX.  This might in part be due to the smaller pool of
qualified accountants and experienced directors in a country of only 20
million (acknowledging the difficulties with complying with a totally
inflexible requirement), but may also be due to Australia’s historic
willingness to look to the UK for guidance in law reform. According to 
the ASX Principles, a board must identify directors it considers independent.
The board should also provide the reasons it considers the individual 
independent “notwithstanding the existence of relationships listed in Box
2.1.” These circumstances, which define “independence” for the purposes 
of the ASX Principles, are substantially similar to the approach taken by 
the NASDAQ and NYSE.  Like the NYSE and NASDAQ requirements,
the ASX Principles note that family ties and interlocking board
memberships may impact independence and should be disclosed. 
Because many of the scandals that produced Sarbanes-Oxley involved 
accounting malfeasance, audit committees were prime candidates for 
reform.  One of the primary reforms to affect the operation of boards of 
directors is Rule 10a-3, promulgated by the SEC under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.  Rule 10a-3 mandates each national securities 
exchange to implement initial and continuing listing requirements that 
contain the provisions of the rule.  Primarily, Rule 10a-3 provides that 
the audit committee be made up of at least three members and that all
NASDAQ, Inc., Listing Rules, § 5605(b) (1), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/
NASDAQ/Main/ [hereinafter NASDAQ Rules]. 
96. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.02; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 95,  
§ 5605(a) (2). 
97. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at recommendation 2.1. 
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members of the committee be independent directors. The rule also
requires audit committees to be responsible for supervising the work of
the registered public accounting firm and to establish a procedure for
complaints relating to accounting or auditing matters.  Finally, audit
committees must have authority to engage independent counsel, advisers,
and funding to carry out its duties.  An additional requirement is SOX 
§ 407, which requires at least one person to be a financial expert. 
The ASX Principles recommend that a board establish an audit 
committee.98  Unlike the approach taken in the United States, the
Principles only recommend that the audit committee consist of a majority of 
independent directors, rather than entirely of independent directors. 
However, the Principles do note that the trend is for the audit committee 
to consist only of independent directors.  Under the ASX Principles, the 
scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities is similar to the framework
established by Sarbanes-Oxley Rule 10a-3.  The audit committee must
“review the integrity of the company’s financial reporting and oversee
the independence of the external auditors”99 and be “given the necessary 
power and resources to meet its charter.”100  Like § 407 of Sarbanes-
Oxley, the ASX Principles also recommend that the audit committee 
include members who are “financially literate”101 and that at least one
member have “relevant qualifications and experience.”102  Furthermore, the
ASX Principles recommend the company disclose the names and 
qualifications of members of the audit committee. Although the ASX
Principles merely offer recommendations about the makeup of an audit
committee, ASX Listing Rules specifically require the top 300 companies
in the S&P All Ordinaries Index103 to have audit committees.104 
The roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board have
also received a great deal of attention.  Many commentators have suggested
these positions be split between two individuals.105  There is no law or 
listing requirement in the United States that requires the Chairman of the 
Board to be separate from the CEO.  However, some firms have identified
98. Id. at Recommendation 4.1.
 99. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 4.3,
Official Commentary.
100. Id.
101. Id. at Recommendation 4.2, Official Commentary.
102. Id.
103. The S&P All Ordinaries Index represents the 500 largest companies in the 
Australian equities market and is published by Standard and Poor’s, a financial market 
information firm. 
104. ASX Recommendation, supra note 83, at Recommendation 4.1. 
105. Joann S. Lublin, Splitting Posts of Chairman, CEO Catches On, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 11, 2002, at B1. 
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a “lead independent director” in an effort to demonstrate strong corporate
governance.106 In contrast, ASX Principles suggest that the Chair should 
be an independent director.107 
2. Executive Compensation 
Given the enormous rise in compensation for senior executives in 
recent years, executive pay has received special scrutiny.  In particular, 
complex compensation packages based on stock option awards have 
caught the eye of regulators.  Much of the scrutiny focused on executives
who were especially cozy with their boards on matters of compensation.
As a result, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ established listing 
requirements that require companies to have a compensation committee 
composed entirely of independent directors.108  Similarly, ASX Principles
recommend a board establish a Remuneration Committee that consists of
a majority of independent directors and is chaired by an independent 
director. In addition to the requirements for independence, companies in 
both the United States and Australia must disclose certain information
regarding the compensation of senior executives.  In the United States,
the SEC has promulgated rules that require companies to disclose
significant information about executive pay through a Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis item in their annual report.109  In addition to
basic information about the amount of compensation, this item also
requires companies to include a narrative, in “plain English,” that 
explains the compensation package and examines the factors that underlie 
each compensation decision.  Similarly, the Australian Corporations Act
requires substantial disclosure in a remuneration report about the
compensation for a company’s senior executives,110 which also must be
open for discussion by members at the annual general meeting.111 and 
put to a non-binding vote of shareholders.112  Like the SEC approach, the
106. See, e.g., Washington Mutual, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 4, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/000127727708000173/ 
april42008.htm.
107. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 2.2. 
108. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A. 
109. Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2009) [hereinafter 
SEC Act].
110. Corporations Act, 2001, § 300A (Austl.). 
111. Id. § 250SA. 
112. Id. § 250R. 
 381
























   
 
 
    
  
    
Australian approach requires companies to disclose the policy for
determining compensation and the relationship between such policy and 
the company’s performance.113 
In addition to shareholder consideration of the remuneration report, 
Australian shareholders are also required to approve termination or 
retirement payments for directors and managers.114  Approval, however,
is not required where the payments are within permissible limits based
upon a statutory formula that factors in the annual remuneration and
length of service of the director or manager.115  As a result of a number
of high profile departure packages paid subsequent to the global
financial crisis,116 the Australian government has recently proposed that
the statutory formula be tightened significantly.  The proposal would
require shareholder approval where the departure payments exceed one
year’s annual salary (previously a long-serving manager or director 
could receive up to seven years annual salary without approval), and 
approval would be required to be given at a general meeting only after 
the manager/director had departed.117 
3. Internal Control and Ethics 
One common thread among the string of corporate scandals is the lack
of ethical principles pertaining to internal governance, particularly with
regard to accounting.  In response, reform has focused on preventative 
mechanisms to ensure that proper internal controls are in place. 
Most significantly, in the United States, management must annually 
file a report assessing the reliability of the company’s internal financial
controls, and independent auditors must attest to that report.118 The
substantial costs of complying with this provision immediately triggered 
heated debate and widespread criticism.119 Perhaps for that reason, 
113. Id. § 300A (1). 
114. Id. §§ 200A, 200B. 
115. Id. § 200F. 
116. See, e.g., Gerard McManus, Sol Trujillo leaves Telstra with a cool $20m, HERALD 
SUN, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25113002-664,00.html. 
117. See Exposure Draft of the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on
Termination Payments) Bill 2009, http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1531/PDF/
Termination_Bill_Exposure_Draft.pdf.
118. SOX, supra note 2, § 404. 
119. Compare Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the 
Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703 (2007) (arguing that the costs of
compliance with SOX 404 are overstated and outweighed by the increased accuracy in 
financial reporting that has resulted), with Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner, 
Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1673 (2007) (arguing that the “marginal costs of
382
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Australia refrained from instituting such a demanding requirement.  The 
ASX Principles simply require that companies establish a sound system
of risk oversight, management, and internal control, or disclose their 
reason for declining to do so.120  At the time SOX was enacted, the amount 
of compliance costs was only speculative.  But now, several years later,
and with the benefit of hindsight, the cost-benefit analysis may be
empirically tested.  Perhaps surprisingly, commentators are increasingly 
opining that the costs of § 404 compliance are outweighed by the benefits;
that is, the initial criticism of § 404 may have been overstated.121  Thus,
Australia may have declined to require audits of internal controls 
because of a knee-jerk reaction to a reform that has ultimately proved to 
be worthwhile. 
In a far less controversial measure, both the United States and 
Australia have encouraged the creation and implementation of internal 
ethics codes.  In a deviation from the norm, the United States incorporated
the Australian disclosure-based approach and requires that public 
companies disclose whether or not they have adopted a code of ethics for 
senior financial officers, including the controller.122  While the ASX 
requires the Code itself, SOX does not compel action by a public company
in this instance. The ASX does. Similarly, under the ASX Principles,
Australian boards should institute a code of conduct to guide the
directors, key executives, and employees as to the “practices necessary
to maintain confidence in the company’s integrity.”123  In addition, the
ethics code should address the “responsibility and accountability of
compliance far exceed the marginal benefits, causing the waste of billions of dollars on 
inefficient implementation of Section 404 controls”).
120. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 7.1. 
121. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 119, at 726–32 (arguing that compliance costs 
are overstated).  Much of the remaining criticism revolves around the disproportionately
high compliance costs for small businesses and whether those businesses should be 
exempt from § 404. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett III, Symposium, Going Private but Staying 
Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2009) (arguing that smaller businesses are more likely to fund their
going private transactions with financing that does not trigger § 404 compliance); Ehud
Kamar, et al., Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-
Country Analysis, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 107, 129–30 (2009) (concluding based on an 
empirical analysis that § 404 “disproportionately burdens small firms”). 
122. SOX, supra note 2, § 406; NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.10. 
123. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 3.1. 
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individuals for reporting and investigating reports and unethical 
practices.”124 
4. Disclosure: Accounting, Continuous Disclosure,   
and Officers’ Certificates 
Issuers, both Australian and American, have long been required to 
periodically prepare and file financial statements (quarterly in the United 
States and semi-annually in Australia).125  Recent developments, however, 
have significantly affected the required contents of those financial 
statements.  Differences have emerged regarding accounting rules governing 
certain situations: an officer’s responsibility for the contents of the 
financial statements, and the responsibility to continuously disclose 
certain developments. 
First, Australia and the United States have adopted different sets of 
accounting standards, which have responded differently to the accounting 
scandals.  Currently, companies registered with the SEC must comply
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP), promulgated 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).126  In 2003,  
Australia joined a growing number of countries that subscribe to the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), promulgated by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).127  Compared to U.S. 
GAAP, IFRS is relatively young and, perhaps consequently, represents a 
more principles-based approach with fewer specific rules addressing 
narrower issues.128 
There are several differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, including, 
for instance, the treatment of off-balance sheet transactions—the primary
124. Id.
125. See ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, §§ 4.1–4.2C (semi-annually).
126. See Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973) (SEC
concluding private sector would most effectively set accounting standards); Commission
Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector 
Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 33-8221, 80 SEC Docket 175, (May 27, 
2003) (reaffirming FASB as delegate in light of Sarbanes-Oxley).
127. See IASB and the IASC Foundation, Who We Are and What We Do, http://www.
iasb.org/Use+around+the+world/Use+around+the+world.htm (listing when all its members,
including Australia, adopted IFRS). 
128. The IASB was preceded by the International Accounting Standards Commission
(IASC), which was founded in 1973.  Stephen A. Zeff, U.S. GAAP Confronts the IASB: 
Roles of the SEC and the European Commission, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 879, 879
(2003). But, until 2001, its founding countries, including the United States, continued to
support their own standard-setting bodies, largely ignoring the IASC.  Id. at 880.  In 
2001, the IASB, which was adequately funded and comprised of independent experts,
issued its first widely-accepted standard. Id. at 885. 
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mechanism through which Enron perpetuated its fraud.129  IFRS, with a
broad brush, effectively prohibits all off-balance sheet transactions, but 
U.S. GAAP permits off-balance sheet transactions if certain 
specific rules are satisfied.130 In this area, U.S. GAAP allows for aggressive
issuers, such as Enron, to structure transactions so that off-balance sheet
treatment is appropriate (formalistically), even thought off-balance sheet 
treatment may be substantively inappropriate.131  SOX now requires
disclosure of all off-balance sheet transactions, but they are still not 
prohibited.132 
At the request of the SEC, since 1988, the FASB and the IASB have 
been implementing a “best efforts” approach to convergence on a topic-
by-topic basis.133 The process has gained momentum, following the SEC’s
announcement in March 2008 that foreign private issuers in the United
States could comply with IFRS without reconciling to U.S. GAAP.134 
At least regarding off-balance sheet transactions, the Enron scandal is 
likely to affect the convergence of FASB and IASB standards.135 
Dissatisfied with executives’ attempts to disclaim knowledge of the 
inner-workings of their financial statements, both countries now require 
129. See Kurt Eichenwald & Michael Brick, Deals that Helped Doom Enron Began
to Form in the Early 90’s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A1. 
130. See John M. Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related 
Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 175, 226 (2004)
(citing F. Robert Buchanan, International Accounting Harmonization: Developing a
Single World Standard, 46 BUS. HORIZONS 3 (2003)).
131. See McDermott Will & Emery, SEC Proposes Roadmap for U.S. Issuers to
Switch to IFRS, (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.mwe.com/info/news/wp1108b.pdf
(interpreting the differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP regarding off-balance sheet 
transactions); Luzi Hall, Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Global Accounting Convergence
and the Potential Adoption of IFRS by the United States: An Analysis of Economic and 
Policy Factors at 35 (Feb. 2009) (reprinted in a letter by the Financial Accounting
Foundation, which oversees the FASB to the SEC, dated Mar. 11, 2009, available at 
http://fasb.org/FAF_SEC_Roadmap_Response_Final_with_Appendix.pdf) (explaining how
bright line rules regarding off-balance sheet transactions could lead to abuse). 
132. SOX, supra note 2, § 404. 
133. See Regulation of the International Securities Markets, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6807, 42 SEC Docket 284 (Nov. 30, 1988). 
134. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared
in Accordance with International Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. 
GAAP, Securities & Exchange Acts Release Nos. 33-8879; 34-57026, 92 SEC Docket 
825 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8879.pdf. 
135. See Hall, Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 131, at 35.  For a discussion of the other
differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, which are less relevant to the specific accounting 
scandals preceding SOX, see id. at 52–54 (fair value accounting, revenue recognition, 
share-based payments, financial liabilities and equity, and consolidations). 
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certain officers to certify, to some degree, the accuracy of the financial
statements.  In the United States, CFOs and CEOs must certify that financial 
reports “fairly present” their company’s financial position and do not 
contain any untrue statement or omission of any material fact necessary
to make other statements made not misleading.136  Similarly, under the
Australian Corporations Act, CFOs and CEOs of listed entities must
certify to the board that the financial statements present a “true and fair” 
view of the company’s financial position.137 
Last, both countries have instituted new requirements regarding the 
continuing obligation to disclose certain information or events that may 
be material to investors.  In the United States, each reporting public 
company must disclose to the public on a “rapid and current basis” any 
material information concerning changes in its financial condition which
is “necessary or useful for the protection of investors and is in the public 
interest.”138  Likewise, in Australia, a disclosure must be made if a
reasonable person would expect the information to have an effect on the
price of the security.139 But, in a deviation from American law, 
Australian law dictates that the amount of time within which the 
company must disclose the information depends on the size of the 
company.  Certain unlisted public companies must disclose the information
“as soon as practical,” but all others must make the disclosure 
“immediately.”140 
5. Related Party Transactions 
Loans to corporate executives were at the center of many of the
corporate scandals that precipitated Sarbanes-Oxley.  Many executives 
exercised stock options and accumulated large equity positions with
cheap loans from their companies.  As a result, there is a general
prohibition on personal loans from a public company to directors and
executives of that company.141  However, this ban is subject to
some exceptions.  Neither the ASX Listing Principles nor the Australian
 136. SOX, supra note 2, §§ 302, 906. 
137. Corporations Act, 2001, § 295A (Austl.). 
138. SOX, supra note 2, § 409. 
139. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.1; Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 6CA, 
§ 674(2) (Austl.). 
140. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.1. A delay of 72 minutes in the release 
of information concerning acquisition negotiations by Rio Tinto Ltd. resulted in 
a $100,000 infringement. ASIC Media Release 08-117, Rio Tinto Complies with ASC 
Infringement Notice, (June 5, 2008),http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/pdf/asic_media_ 
release_08_117_ rio_tinto.pdf.
141. SOX, supra note 2, § 402. 
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Corporations Act contains an outright prohibition on loans to public 
company directors or executives.  Yet, the Australian Corporations Act
requires public companies to obtain member approval for loans to related 
parties.142  This prohibition is also subject to a number of exceptions. 
6. Enforcement 
The SEC has a variety of tools available to enforce the provisions of 
the federal securities laws which relate to corporate governance.
Perhaps the most fundamental tool is the general prohibition on fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, embodied in Rule 
10b-5. Because Rule 10b-5 prohibits material misrepresentations in 
SEC filings and statements made to the public, it acts as a strong curb on
corporate malfeasance.  The SEC may seek civil penalties for violations 
of Rule 10b-5 and other securities laws.  Sarbanes-Oxley also broadened
the availability of and sentencing guidelines for criminal penalties for 
violating securities laws.143  It increased the maximum prison sentence
for falsifying or destroying audit records to ten years.144  Additionally, 
the implied private right of action associated with Rule 10b-5 augments
the use of the tool by the SEC or the Department of Justice. 
The SEC also has available tools that are tailored to executive
compensation, sales of company stock, and service on a board of
directors.  New regulations have targeted executives that receive lucrative
compensation packages based on improper or fraudulent financial reports.
Specifically, CEOs and CFOs must forfeit any bonuses and profits
received from the sale of company securities during the twelve month 
period following the filing of a financial report for which an accounting 
restatement was required due to accounting or reporting misconduct.145 
Finally, the SEC may prohibit any person from serving as an officer or
director if they have violated certain anti-fraud provisions and their
conduct demonstrates “unfitness” to serve.146 
The Australian enforcement scheme also provides for disqualification
from board membership and civil penalties.  A person can be disqualified 
142. Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 2E (Austl.). 
143. SOX, supra note 2, §§ 802 (criminal penalties for altering documents), 805
(sentencing guidelines), 807 (criminal penalties for defrauding shareholders). 
144. SOX, supra note 2, § 802. 
145. SOX, supra note 2, § 402. 
146. SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.10(b). 
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under the Corporations Act from managing corporations for convictions 
for certain serious offenses; for involvement in failed corporations; for
awaiting discharge in bankruptcy; and for repeated contraventions of the 
Corporations Act.147  The civil penalty provisions of the Corporations
Act now provide a maximum civil penalty for corporate offenders of up
to $1 million (up from the previous $200,000).  Compensation for losses 
may also be provided.148 
7. Auditing Functions and Auditing Independence 
As the wave of accounting scandals rolled past the millennium, with
building agitation, legislators and investors looked to the independent 
auditors—the “public watchdogs”149—for an explanation of how these 
frauds remained undetected.  The regulation that resulted from these 
inquiries reveals the perception that auditors have failed to maintain their 
independence from their clients.  Consequently, both Australia and the
United States have assumed a greater role of supervision over the audit 
profession and have attempted to remove, or at least diminish, several 
frequently occurring situations perceived as likely to undermine an 
auditor’s independence. 
i. Heightened Supervision of the Audit Profession 
Both Australia and the United States concluded that it was no longer
appropriate for the auditing profession to remain fully self-regulating. 
Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), a five-member board partially independent of the accounting 
profession, and overseen by the SEC, to set auditing, quality, control, 
and independence standards.150  Instead of creating a new regulating entity, 
Australia, in CLERP 9, expanded the responsibilities of the Financial 
Reporting Council to oversee the setting of auditing standards, advise 
and monitor auditor independence, promote the teaching of professional 
and business ethics, and monitor the adequacy of disciplinary procedures.151
 147. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 2D.6 (Austl.). 
148. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 9.4, § 1317G (B1) (Austl.). 
149. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (characterizing
auditors as “public watchdogs”). 
150. SOX, supra note 2, § 101.  Only two members of the board may be certified
public accountants.  Id. at (e) (2). 
151. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act, 2001, pt. 12, div. 3, 
subdiv. A (Austl.) [hereinafter ASIC Act]. 
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Despite the differing approaches, however, both countries are clearly
taking a more proactive role in overseeing the auditing profession. 
ii. Potential Conflicting Interests 
The accounting scandals revealed that auditors had repeatedly failed to 
maintain independence from their clients.  In investigating the cause,
several characteristics of the auditor-client relationship were illuminated 
as potential sources of conflicting interests.  Authorities, both in the
United States and Australia, tailored regulations to specifically address the
problematic areas.
For instance, the external auditor is charged with the responsibility of 
maintaining independence from its client, but the client hires and fires 
the auditor and pays the audit fees.  The conflicting interests inherent in
such a relationship potentially enable the client to improperly influence 
its auditor. While both Australian and American law address this issue,
Sarbanes-Oxley does so more specifically. In the United States, an
officer or director of a public company is prohibited from fraudulently
influencing or coercing any independent, public auditor that is 
performing an audit on the company.152  In Australia, general principles, 
rather than specific rules, govern the improper influence of auditors. 
Since 2004, the Corporations Act provides that there should be auditor
independence; that auditors are required to annually declare to the board
that the auditor has maintained its independence; that financial
relationships between the auditor and the audit client are restricted; and
that Professional Standards on Independence are applied, requiring the
auditor to identify threats to independence and safeguards to be 
employed.153 
In a more recent development, during the 1990s, public accounting 
firms began deriving increasingly substantial proportions of their 
revenue from non-auditing services, particularly consulting services.154
 152. SOX, supra note 2, § 303; SEC Act, supra note 109, §§ 240.13b2-2 (b) (1), (b)
(2), (2) (c).
153. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 307A–C, 300(11B), 307C (Austl.).
154. See Dep’t of the Treasury, Final Report of the Advisory Comm. on the Auditing 
Profession, in SEC SPEAKS IN 2009 693, 704 (2009) (committee co-chaired by Arthur 
Levitt., Jr., and Donald T. Nicolaisen) (“Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley, audit fees were on
average approximately only 50% of total fees charged to audit clients. That percentage 
increased dramatically to approximately 80% by 2006.”). 
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Under such a compensation structure, the client boasts greater leverage 
when negotiating disputes with its auditors because the accounting firm 
stands to lose not only its audit revenue, but also its more lucrative
consulting revenue. Likely to compromise auditor independence, this 
situation was ripe for reform.  The United States, compared to Australia,
took a more hard-line approach.  Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits independent 
auditors from performing non-auditing services, such as consulting 
contemporaneously with an audit, unless the non-audit services amount
to less than 5% of the total annual fees.155  The act exempts a few types
of services, all of which require pre-approval by the audit committee.156 
In Australia, the Professional Standards on Independence, since 2004, 
require the auditor to identify threats to independence, as well as any 
appropriate safeguards to be employed.  In some situations, Australian 
companies must disclose that they are performing non-audit services and
explain why those services do not compromise its independence.157 
Not only are auditors limited in the type of services that may be
provided, but new regulations also restrict who may provide those 
services.  Today, an audited company may be so large that its audit
requires the full-time attention of a partner at an audit firm.  Recognizing 
the risk that a partner may become subservient to such a client and 
tempted to sacrifice ethics to retain the company as a client, both
Australia and the United States now require “rotation” of the auditor 
(within the same accounting firm) every five years.158  The only major
difference between the two laws is that in the United States, only the 
audit partner must rotate,159 but in Australia, all auditors with a
“significant role in the audit” must rotate.160 
Likewise, both Australian and American legislatures recognize the
potential conflicting interests that arise when employees of an 
independent auditor become employees of its client, or vice-versa.  To
limit the effects of intertwined staffs, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits an
accounting firm from auditing a public company if a senior finance 
executive of the client was employed by the accounting firm and that
person participated in the audit of the company during the preceding 
year.161  Similarly, in Australia, since 2004, a professional member of an 
155. SOX, supra note 2, § 208. 
156. Id.
157. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324 CA–324 CH (Austl.). 
158. SOX, supra note 2, § 208; Corporations Act, 2001 § 324 DA (Austl.). 
159. SOX, supra note 2, § 208. 
160. Corporations Act, 2001, § 324 DA (Austl.). 
161. SOX, supra note 2, § 208. 
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audit firm is prohibited from becoming a director or other responsible 
officer of an audited company within two years from departing the audit 
firm.162 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY 
INSURANCE IN THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA
A. United States 
Directors and Officers (D & O) liability insurance is a product that 
emerged in the 1930s, shortly after the enactment of the Securities Act 
of 1933 and Securities Act of 1934.163 Publicly held corporations,
however, did not widely purchase this coverage in the United States until 
the 1970s. At that time, judicial interpretation of liability under federal 
securities laws brought increased exposure to directors, officers, and the 
corporation itself.164  Today, almost all publicly held corporations hold
D & O policies.165 
The market for D & O liability insurance historically has been a 
cyclical one, with both “hard” and “soft” cycles.166  In a hard market, 
underwriters become more selective, more interested in higher 
attachment points, less willing to offer high limits, less willing to 
162. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324 CI, 324 CJ (Austl.). 
163. See M. Martin Boyer, Three Insights from the Canadian D & O Insurance
Market:  Inertia, Information and Insiders, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 75, 77 (2008); Joseph P. 
Monteleone, Directors’ and Officers Liability Insurance: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and other Topical Issues, in ENRON, WORLDCOM, AND THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
OF 2002: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, AUDITING, AND OTHER
ISSUES 313, 315 (2002) [hereinafter Monteleone].
164. Monteleone, supra note 163. 
165. See id.; Towers Perrin, Directors and Officers Liability Survey: 2006 Survey of
Insurance Purchasing and Claims Trends (2006) [hereinafter Perrin Survey],
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=HRS/USA/2007/200704/DO_S
urvey_Report2006_040507.pdf;  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate 
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, n.2 (2007). 
166. Gary Lockwood, D&O Insurance: The Cycle of Change, 16 PROF. LIABILITY 
UNDERWRITING SOC’Y J., 1, 3 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.lordbissell.com/
Newsstand/Lockwood-D&OInsurance-PLUS_10-2003.pdf; Tom Baker & Sean J. 
Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors &
Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007) (The D&O 
insurance market went through this hard phase in the mid-1980s and again in 2001–
2003. More recently, the D&O insurance market has been shifting to the soft phase.) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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negotiate contract terms, and able to command dramatically higher prices
for what amounts to less coverage.167  During the 1980s, the insurance 
industry entered a hard cycle where premiums rose dramatically and it 
was difficult for some corporations to secure D & O coverage.168  The
opposite occurs during a soft cycle, as was experienced during the
1990s, where insurers competed for business and broader coverage was 
available at a better price.169
 167. Baker & Griffith, supra note 165, at 507. 
168. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 415 (2005); see Michael
D. Sousa, Making Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicket: The “Insured vs. Insured” 
Exclusion in the Bankruptcy Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 374–75 (2007) 
(stating that the Van Gorkom decision caused insurance companies to become “skittish”
about issuing liability insurance coverage for a corporation’s directors and officers); 
Jack. B. Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-Procedure Distinction in Contemporary Corporate 
Litigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (“Van Gorkom’s . . . impact was 
to create a national directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance crisis. The insurance
industry reacted to the decision by raising the cost of D&O liability insurance to almost
prohibitive levels, and in some cases, stopped providing D&O insurance altogether.”);
Henry N. Butler, Smith v. Van Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of
Random Mutations in the Evolution of Corporate Law, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 267, n.19 
(2006) (“The initial effect of Van Gorkom was to increase directors and officers (D&O) 
insurance rates or to make D&O insurance unavailable.”); William T. Allen, Jack B. 
Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review
in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, n.49 (2001) (noting that after Van
Gorkom, the D&O insurance industry sharply increased their premiums, and in some
cases threatened to stop writing D&O insurance policies); see also  Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Lloyd L. Drury, III, What’s the Cost of a Free Pass?
A Call for the Re-Assessment of Statutes that Allow for the Elimination of Personal
Liability for Directors, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 99, 105–07 (2007); Florence 
Shu-Acquaye, Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in Light of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 19, 19 (2004). The 1985 case, 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, was a landmark decision in the United States as it clarified the 
requisites for a breach of the fiduciary duty of care. Van Gorkom involved the sale of 
Trans Union Corporation.  Jerome Van Gorkom, the CEO and a significant stockholder
of Trans Union, discussed selling the company with some of his fellow executives, but 
only preliminarily.  As part of these discussions, he received basic financial data on
financing the buyout.  Using this information, Van Gorkom approached the potential 
buyer who offered to purchase Trans Union.  Van Gorkom called a meeting of the Trans 
Union board on only two days notice.  At the meeting, he gave an oral presentation but 
did not provide financial analysis or any written documentation, and did not disclose the 
circumstances of the negotiation process.  The board asked very few follow-up questions
before approving the merger.  The Delaware Supreme Court found that the board’s 
actions violated the duty of care and that the board acted in a grossly negligent manner in 
deciding to accept the offer.  The court based its conclusion on the finding that he board
did not act on an informed basis when making its decision to proceed with the 
acquisition. Before Van Gorkom, courts did not find directors personally liable absent a 
conflict of interest.  However, in Van Gorkom, the court found the directors liable based 
solely on the breach of the duty of care.
169. Lockwood, supra note 167, at 3.
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The unprecedented number of highly publicized securities fraud class 
action lawsuits and accounting scandals in the early twenty-first century 
rocked the D & O insurance industry.170  The number of lawsuits naming
individual directors and officers increased dramatically, and damages, 
settlements, and the costs of litigation and regulatory proceedings
soared.171  Sarbanes-Oxley brought about more risk by further exposing
directors and officers to liability.172 As a result, premiums increased 
approximately 30% in 2001 and 30% in 2002.173  In 2003, premiums 
increased 33%.174 Premiums for the largest companies, those with market
capitalizations of $5 billion or more, increased as much as 70% in
2004.175  In an attempt to quantify the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley, a survey
of mostly mid-cap companies found that the cost of being a public
company almost doubled, from $1.3 million to almost $2.5 million.176 
Mid-cap companies generally have a market capitalization between $2 
billion and $10 billion. The increased costs were attributed to the added 
liability of the chief executive officer, who is required to personally sign 
off on the company’s financial statement.177  According to the survey, 
almost two-thirds of the increased expense was D & O liability insurance, 
170. Anjali C. Das, The ABCs of D & O Insurance: An Illinois Lawyer’s Guide, 93 
ILL. B.J. 304, 304 (2005); see also Fairfax, supra note 168, at 415; Kate Burgess,
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Demand and Cost Set to Rise: Kate Burgess Analyses 
the Impact of Scandal, FIN. TIMES (Eng.), April 25, 2006, at 3; Randy Paar, Insurance 
Coverage in the World of Sarbanes-Oxley, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: COMMERCIAL 
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 217, 221 (2003) (Address before the
Practicing Law Institute: D&O Liability & Insurance in a Sarbanes-Oxley World (June 3,
2003)); Mairi Mallon, U.S. D & O Lulled into a False Sense of Security?, REINSURANCE
MAG., Nov. 1, 2006, at 20; Sousa, supra note 168, at 375 (noting an increase in premiums
after the Enron, Adelphia Communications, and Tyco scandals). 
171. Securities Class Action Case Filings 2002: A Year in Review, available 
at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2002_YIR/2002_yir_settlements.
pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010); ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES 970 (9th ed. 2005). 
172. Id.; see also Sousa, supra note 168, at 377–78. 
173. JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., DIRECTOR & OFFICER LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION AND 
INSURANCE § 4.26 (2007). 
174. Id.
 175. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 171, at 970.  But see OLSON ET AL., supra
note 173, at § 4.26 (stating premiums decreased in 2004). 
176. J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of 
Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. L.J. 339, 347 (2005). 
177. See id.
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which averaged $329,000 prior to Sarbanes-Oxley and grew to $639,000
afterwards.178 
As a result of Sarbanes-Oxley and increased shareholder litigation, 
some of the largest commercial insurance companies reduced their D & 
O coverage obligations by increasing deductibles and lowering limits on 
overall coverage, thus exposing directors to increasing liability.179  As  
insurer capacity deteriorated and insurers left the market, a large number
of new insurers emerged to offer D & O coverage to public companies.180 
Because demand rose between 2000 and 2003, more insurers entered the 
market, causing D & O premiums to fall.181  In addition, class actions
against U.S. listed companies declined, resulting in reduced premiums.182 
In a matter of just a few years, a post-scandal, hard cycle quickly went 
soft. Despite the current soft cycle, demand for protection remains
unabated.183 
A 2006 Towers Perrin Directors and Officers Liability Survey reported a
continuing soft market for D & O insurance.184  As a result,  survey  
participants generally reported higher limits, slightly lower retentions 
and premiums, broader coverage, and fewer exclusions.185  Interest in an
organization’s D & O program by potential directors increased.186  In  
2006, premiums decreased by 6.5%, and 31% of participants reported an
increase in coverage enhancements.187  In addition, over 99% of public
companies purchased D & O insurance.188 
The Survey also reported an increased interest in Side A of D & O
insurance.  Side A D & O insurance policies cover the individual directors
and officers when they are not indemnified by their organization.189  For
public companies, 38% reported purchasing such a policy.190 
178. Id. at 348. 
179. Fairfax, supra note 168, at 415. 
180. See Mairi Mallon, supra note 170, at 20 (noting that Lloyd’s of London 
virtually ceased providing D & O insurance to public companies).
181. See Burgess, supra note 170, at 3.
182. See id.
183. See id.
 184. Perrin Survey, supra note 165 (The annual Towers Perrin D & O survey is based
on a nonrandom, self-selecting sample of companies.  It is also the only systematic source of




188. Id.; Baker & Griffith, supra note 165, at. 487, n. 2.
189. See Sousa, supra note 170, at 379-80.  Specifically, “Side A” Coverage provides 
liability coverage directly to the officers and directors of a corporation for claims asserted
against them for their wrongful acts, errors, omissions, or breaches of duty.  A-Side Coverage 
insures the corporate directors and officers in the event that the corporation does not or 
394
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Additionally, the Survey provided the following data representing the 
types of D & O allegations from shareholder claimants against public 
companies: accounting fraud 2%; breach of duty to minority shareholders
4%; dishonestly/fraud 3%; general breach of fiduciary duty 12%;
inadequate disclosure including financial reporting 37%; and stock and
other public offering 19%.
B. Australia 
Most Australian public companies purchase D & O insurance.191 
Companies purchase D & O policies for the benefit of their directors and 
officers.192  The company may pay the premium in full, or alternatively, 
have an agreement where the covered individuals also contribute, thereby 
giving the individuals privity of contract.193  Subsections 300(8) and (9)
of the Corporations Act require reporting entities who have paid all or 
part of the premium costs to disclose that fact in their annual report.194 
Under a D & O policy, a company may obtain insurance coverage
with respect to its directors and officers for any liability they may incur 
for wrongful acts committed by them in the conduct of their duties.195 
Although the definition of wrongful acts varies from insurer to insurer, a 
typical definition includes any actual breach of duty, breach of trust, 
neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement, omission, or any 
cannot indemnify them under any applicable corporate documents or laws.  A-Side
Coverage is significant because it protects directors and officers where the corporation is
financially unable to indemnify due to insolvency or bankruptcy, or is legally unable to 
indemnify due to prohibitions under state corporation law or the corporation’s own by-
laws or articles of incorporation. Id.  In contrast, “Side B” coverage provides reimbursement 
to the corporation for amounts paid as indemnification to its directors and officers, and 
“Side C” coverage, also known as entity coverage, protects the company itself against 
various claims made directly against it.  Marc H. Falladori, Stock Option Backdating—
Regulators and Plaintiffs Take the Controversy to the Next Level, in  PREPARATION OF
ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS ch. 16, 666 (2007). 
190. Perrin Survey, supra note 165. 
191. Cheffins & Black, supra note 65, at 1437. 
192. See  CORPORATIONS AND MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS INSURANCE REPORT 6, June 2004, http://www.camac.gov.au/CAMAC/camac.nsf/0/
04A9BFD9B3915EA7CA256ED9000DE5AD/$file/D&O_Insurance_report_Jun2004.pdf 
[hereinafter CMAC Report]. 
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 6–7. 
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liability asserted against them solely because of their status as directors 
or officers of the company.196 
Section 199B of the Corporations Act provides that D & O policies 
cannot cover (other than for legal costs) any liability by the directors or 
officers arising out of willful breach of duty in relation to the company;
improper use of position; or improper use of information.197  However, it 
is common for Australian D & O policies to have standard exclusions 
over and above § 199B including prospectus liability; professional
indemnity; insider trading; claims brought by shareholders; claims
arising from breaches of environmental or occupational health and safety
regulations; and claims alleging dishonesty or fraud.198 
Similar to the market in the U.S., the Australian D & O market entered 
a hard cycle after the HIH Casualty and General Insurance LTD collapse
and other financial scandals.199  Significant capital left the insurance market, 
although sufficient competition remains in Australia amongst twelve to 
fourteen Australia-based insurers.
Further, after the scandals earlier this decade, premiums increased
markedly.200  However, there was no hard and fast rule, as some insureds
incurred little increase, while others experienced increases in excess of
300%.  Brokers and underwriters surveyed by Clayton Utz speculated 
that organizations listed in the U.S. or Canada, or organizations with
operations and assets in the U.S. and Canada, have generally been the
most severely affected.  Increases at the time ranged from 10% to 30%, 
with London based insurers averaging a 20% to 50% increase.  However, 
the market has leveled off, as indicated by a general insurance survey 
conducted by JP Morgan Deloitte, finding that D & O premiums fell 6%
in 2006.201 
196. See id. at 7. 
197. Id. at 7. 
198. Id. at 7–8. 
199. See Clayton Utz, Directors and Officers Insurance: Survey Findings, http://www. 
strategicsolutions.com.au/Pages/documents/April%202003%20-%20D&OInsurance%20-
%20Market%20Survey%20conducted%20in%20collaboration%20with%20Clayton%20Utz.
pdf at 3. The financial scandals included self-dealing between HIH Insurance and an outside
director, insider trading by a non-executive director for Telstra, and three cases of out of 
pocket liability arising from insufficient vigilance by outside directors involving Clifford
Corporation, One.Tel, and Water Wheel Holdings.  Cheffins & Black, supra note 65, at 
1441. 
200. Utz, supra note 199, at 3; CMAC Report, supra note 192, at 3. 
201. JP Morgan, 2006 General Insurance Industry Survey, at 5 (2006) http://www.
deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/JPMorgan_Deloitte_Survey_06_low_res(2).pdf; CMAC Report,
supra note 192, at 6.
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The Clayton Utz survey reported that insurers did not withdraw
coverage from 2002 to 2003.202 However, during the hard cycle, 
insurers underwrote more selectively, focused on pricing, and limited 
conditions of coverage.203 Further, recent developments such as the ASX
Corporate Governance Guidelines and the extent of a company’s
compliance with these guidelines have the ability to impact an insurer’s 
decision to provide coverage, as well as the terms and conditions of that 
coverage.204 
Despite these developments, for both Australia and the U.S., a soft 
market exists that has loosened terms of coverage.  For example, in 
Australia, one can now obtain coverage for civil fines and penalties 
where such coverage was not available previously.205  In the U.S., soft 
markets have ultimately proved advantageous for directors seeking to
protect their personal assets and for those seeking to fill previous gaps in 
coverage, such as non-rescindability.206  Also, in both countries, changes
to liability have pushed for improved coverage in order to lure desirable 
candidates to serve on boards.  Both countries cite difficulty, proving
that new liability has actually encouraged a potential candidate to decline a
position, but the fear remains.207 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Both the United States and Australia have focused on a duty of care
and a climate of disclosure and trust in order to ensure a fair 
marketplace. Despite these efforts, both countries experienced scandal 
in the last decade and the credit crisis today, revealing gaps in corporate 
regulation. Corporate collapses in Australia of HIH, Harris-Scarfe, and 
202. Utz, supra note 199, at 3.
203. See CMAC Report, supra note 192, at 39. 
204. See id.
 205. Paul Stock, With Great Power . . . , RISK MAG., May 19, 2008, http://www.risk 
managementmagazine.com.au/articles/49/0C056949.asp?Type=124&Category=1240. 
206. See Stephen J. Weiss & Thomas H. Bentz, Jr., The D & O Insurance Market is
Soft: What You can do to Take Advantage of Changing Market Conditions, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, (Sept. 22, 2007), http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6900927/The-D-O-
insurance-market.html#abstract.
207. See Berna Collier, Current Corporate Governance Issues: An ASIC Perspective, 
Sept. 19, 2003, available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/nt_
bus&prof_women_corp_gov190903.pdf/$file/nt_bus&prof_women_corp_gov190903.pdf
(Berna Collier, Commissioner, ASIC, addressed the Northern Territory Chapter of the
Business & Professional Women’s Chapter and the ASIC Women’s Network). 
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One.Tel, however, resulted in legislative reforms and stronger corporate 
governance standards.208  Sarbanes-Oxley has similarly ushered in new
standards.209  As the impact of the credit crisis continues to emerge, new
corporate governance standards will likely experience their first real test. 
Past and present scandals have also affected directors and officers
liability and the availability of coverage for such claims.  Increased
shareholder class action lawsuits, high damage awards in those lawsuits,
and claims related to the restatement of earnings for both countries have
had strong impacts on carriers.  Nonetheless, the D & O market has
softened faster than many would have expected, driving coverage for 
claims up and the cost for coverage down for both countries.  Such
similarities in the D & O marketplace have the potential positive 
outcome of creating predictable, and similar, risk management practices 
for companies operating in both markets—a silver lining perhaps. 
Despite this similarity, there are key differences that may prevent a 
true synergy and may impact regulatory response to the scandals that
have led to the recent economic downturn.  First, there appears to be fear 
in Australia that rampant liability will prevent top candidates from 
taking directorships. There is speculation that this fear will drive
regulators to loosen the stronghold on directors and officers’ liability.
While this fear exists in the United States as well, it appears to be less 
pronounced and will be less likely to serve as an impetus for minimizing 
governance standards. 
Second, there are distinctions between how liability is assigned in the
United States and Australia.  The U.S. channels most of its corporate
reforms through Sarbanes-Oxley with regulators and exchanges playing 
supporting roles.  Australia, on the other hand, relies more heavily on
regulators and exchanges in addition to employing many no-fault
provisions that the United States does not.  Also, Australian law
incorporates the business judgment rule into their code210 while the rule
remains largely entrenched in the common law of the United States.  For
Australia, these factors combine with a soft D & O market to favor
directors and officers with regard to increased coverage and a push to 
expand the business judgment rule so that some directors can delegate 
208. See von Nessen, supra note 47. 
209. See generally Tomasic, supra note 3; von Nessen, supra note 47. 
210. In Australia, an officer or director’s decision is protected from interference by
a court if it is made in good faith for a proper purpose; the officer or director does not 
have a material personal in the subject matter of the judgment; the officer or director informs 
themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe 
to be appropriate; and the officer or director rationally believe that the judgment is in the 
best interests of the corporation. Corporations Act, 2001, § 180(2). 
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more liability down to lower-level officers.  The credit crisis may cause 
the push to lessen, however. 
In the United States, these factors seem to have created a more
traditional soft market response with D & O insurance—lower premiums
and increased access to coverage.  Also, the market is responding by allowing 
even better coverage for independent board members.  Fundamental
changes in liability law, however, do not appear forthcoming. On
the contrary, a lack of successful prosecutions under Sarbanes-Oxley or 
the resulting regulations seems, in and of itself, to have alleviated much 
anxiety over the risk that directors and officers may bear. The current
credit crisis may revive that anxiety.  Nonetheless, the shared process of
enduring scandal and reforming markets has, on the whole, brought 
much commonality to the American and Australian governance model— 
a positive for carriers and publicly traded companies worldwide who 
operate in either or both markets. 
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VI. APPENDIX A 
The following chart summarizes the similarities and differences between 
the reform in the United States and in Australia.211 
Reform United States Australia 
Regulation of Boards, Committees, and Directors
Director Independent directors must Independent directors 
Independence comprise a majority of the 
board.212 An independent
director is a director who 
has no material relationship, 




(1) former employment by
the company within three 
years; 
(2) former employment by
the company’s independent 
auditor within three years; 
(3) interlocking directorship 
within three years with the 
CEO on the compensation 
committee; and 
(4) any of the above 
relationships if maintained
by any immediate family 
member of the director.213 
should comprise a majority
of the board.214 An
independent director is a 
non-executive director who 
is not part of management
and has no other 
relationship that could or
could be perceived to
materially interfere with
the independent exercise of 
the director’s judgment. 
The corporation should
state its reasons for 
considering a director 
independent if that 
director: 
(1) is a substantial 
shareholder or associate; 
(2) was employed within
the last three years as an 
executive of the company 
or group; 
(3) was, within the last 
three years, a principal of a 
material professional
adviser or consultant (or an
employee materially 
211. An earlier version of this chart was published by Paul von Nessen, see supra
note 47. 
212. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303(A) (1). 
213. Id. § 303(A) (2). 
214. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at recommendation 2.1. 
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associated with providing 
the service);
(4) was a material supplier
or customer (or an officer 
or associate of such); or 
(5) has a material 
contractual relationship 
with the company or 
group. 
Independence of The chairman need not be The chair should be an 
the Chairman of an independent director and independent director,216 
the Board may simultaneously serve as 
the CEO.215 
and should not 
simultaneously serve as the 
CEO.217 
Board The company must have an ASX top 500 companies 
Committees audit committee, a 
nomination committee, and 
a compensation committee 
consisting solely of
independent directors.218 
must have an audit
committee.219 All other 
listed companies should
have an audit committee, a 
nomination committee, and 
a remuneration committee, 
each with a majority of
independent directors.220 
215. While no law or regulation in the United States prohibits the CEO from 
simultaneously serving as a non-independent director, some firms are moving towards 
the identification of a “lead independent director” in an effort to demonstrate strong
governance. See, e.g., Washington Mutual, supra note 106. 
216. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 2.2. 
217. Id. at Recommendation 4.2 (audit committees are required for all companies in 
the ASX 300 index by ASX Listing Rule 12.7). 
218. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.4–6; SEC Act, supra note 109,  
§ 240.10A-3(b) (1). 
219. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 4.2 (Audit 
committees are required for the ASX top 300 by ASX Listing Rule 12.7). 
220. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendations 2.4, 4.1, 8.1.
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Audit Committees The audit committee of 
public companies must 
consist only of 
independent directors.221 
If applicable, SOX 
requires the reasons for 
declining to include at 
least one financial expert 
must be disclosed.222 
However, the NYSE 
requires the chair of the
committee to have 
accounting or financial 
management expertise.223 
The committee must 
retain responsibility for 
the appointment, 
compensation, and 
oversight of auditors.224 
It must establish
procedures for the 
treatment of accounting 
complaints; have
authority and funding to
engage independent
advisors; and have 
authority to approve 
accounts.225 
The audit committee 
should consist of at least 
three directors. All 
members should be non-
executive directors; a 
majority of the members
should be independent; and 
the chair, who should also 
be independent, should not 
also be the chair of the 
board. Companies must
disclosure the names and 
qualifications of audit 
committee members. All 
members should be 
financially literate, and at 
least one member should 
have accounting or related 
financial expertise.226 The 
committee should review 
the scope, results, and cost 
effectiveness of the audit; 
the independence and 
objectivity of the auditors; 
and all non-audit services 
provided by the auditors.227 
Regulation of Internal Governance: Internal Controls and Ethics
Assessment of An “internal control Companies should
Internal Control report” must be audited 
and filed annually, stating
the responsibilities of
management for 




221. See SOX, supra note 2, § 301. 
222. Id. § 407. 
223. NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.07. 
224. SOX, supra note 2, § 301. 
225. Id.; NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.07; SEC Act, supra note 109,  
§ 240.10A-3(b)(2)–(5). 
226. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendations 4.2, 4.3. 
227. ASX, Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 12.7.
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Code of Ethics Public companies must 
disclose in periodic 
reports whether or not 
they have adopted a code
of ethics for senior
financial officers.230 
Companies should
establish a code of conduct 
to guide the directors and
key executives as to the 
practices necessary to 
maintain confidence in the 
company’s integrity as 
well as the accountability 
of individuals for reporting 
and investigating reports of
unethical practices. 231 
Disclosure Requirements
Accounting Financial statements must Australia has adopted the 
Standards be prepared in accordance 
with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles 







convergence with the 
International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), as promulgated 














ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 7.1. 
SOX, supra note 2, § 404. 
SOX, supra note 2, § 406; NYSE Manual, supra note 95, § 303A.10. 
ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 3.1. 
SOX, supra note 2, § 101. 
ASIC Act, supra note 151, §§ 232–33. 
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Board (IASB) is currently 
under way. 
Off-Balance Sheet U.S. GAAP permits IFRS, the set of accounting
Transactions companies to enter into
off-balance sheet
transactions, subject to 
specified limitations. But, 
SOX requires all such 
transactions be
disclosed.234 





Officer The CFOs and CEOs of Since 2004, the CFO and 
Certification of SEC registrants must CEO of listed entities must 
Financial Reports certify that the financial 
reports “fairly present”
the company’s financial
position and do not
contain any untrue 
statement or omission of 
material fact.236 
certify to the board that 
accounts present a “true
and fair” view.237 
Continuous Each reporting public ASX listing rules require 
Disclosure company must disclose to
the public on a “rapid and
current basis” any 
additional information
concerning material
changes in its financial 
condition which is 
necessary or useful for the 
protection of investors 
and is in the public 
interest.238 
listed companies to inform
the ASX “immediately”
when they become aware 
of any information which a 
reasonable person would
expect to have an effect on 
the price or value of its 
securities. Certain unlisted
public companies must 
inform ASIC “as soon as 
practical” in similar 
circumstances.239
 234. SOX, supra note 2, § 404. 
235. See McDermott Will & Emery, supra note 131. 
236. See SOX, supra note 2, §§ 302, 906; SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.13a–14a. 
237. Corporations Act, 2001, § 295A (Austl.). 
238. SOX, supra note 2, § 409. 
239. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.1; Corporations Act, 2001, § 674 (2)
(Austl.). Rio Tinto, supra note 140. 
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Related Party Transactions
Loans to Personal loans, with some A public company must 
Directors, exceptions, may not be obtain member approval 
Executives, and given by a public for loans to related parties, 
Other Related company to directors and subject to a number of 
Parties executives of that 
240company.
exceptions.241  Regulation 
of non-recourse loans is 
currently under 
consideration. 
Insider Trading Officers, directors and Substantial shareholders 
Disclosure 10% shareholders are 
required to report changes
in ownership of securities 
or the purchase/sale of a
security-based swap 
agreement.242 
(5% shareholding or more)
must comply with statutory 
notice provisions.243 
Listed companies are 
required to notify the ASX 
of directors’ holdings, and 
the ASX principles 
recommend formulation 
and disclosure of policies 
concerning trading in
company securities by
directors, officers, and 
employees.244 
Consequences of Violations
Executive To be approved by For executives, ASX 
Compensation shareholders.  CEOs and 
CFOs must forfeit any 
bonuses and profits
received from the sale of 
company securities during 
the 12 month period
following the filing of a 
Principles recommend a 






 240. SOX, supra note 2, § 402. 
241. Corporations Act, 2001, ch. 2E (Austl.). 
242. SOX, supra note 2, § 403. 
243. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 6C.1 (Austl.). 
244. ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, § 3.19A; ASX Recommendations, supra
note 83, at Recommendation 3.2.
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financial report for which only receive fees.246 A 
an accounting restatement remuneration report for 
was required due to listed companies is 
accounting or reporting statutorily required to be 
misconduct.245 considered by 
shareholders, while equity
based remuneration and
termination payments are 
regulated by statute and by
the ASX Listing rules.247 
Disqualification of SEC may prohibit any A person can be
Directors and person from serving as an disqualified under the 
Officers officer or director if they
have violated certain anti-
fraud provisions and their 
conduct demonstrates 
“unfitness” to serve.248 
Corporations Act from
managing corporations for 
convictions for certain






the Corporations Act.249 
Penalties and The SEC may seek civil The civil penalty 
Disgorgement by penalties for securities provisions of the 
Officers of laws violations, the Corporations Act now 
Certain Profits proceeds of which will be
diverted to accounts to
compensate victims of 
related securities law 
violations.250 SOX 
broadened the availability 
of and sentencing
guidelines for criminal 
provide a maximum civil
penalty for corporate 
offenders of up to
$1 million (up from the 
previous $200,000). 
Compensation for losses 
may also be provided.253
 245. SOX, supra note 2, § 304. 
246. ASX Recommendations, supra note 83, at Recommendation 8.2, (Box 8.1). 
247. Corporations Act, 2001, § 250SA, (Austl.) (remuneration report), ch. 2E (related 
party benefits), ch. 2D, pt. 2 (termination payments); ASX Listing Rules, supra note 89, 
§ 10.11et seq. (securities issued to persons of influence). 
248. SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.10B1. 
249. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 2D.6 (Austl.). 
250. Id.
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penalties for violating
securities laws.251 It 
increased the maximum
prison sentence for 
falsifying or destructing
audit records to ten 
252years.
Regulation of Independent Auditors
Prohibited Registered accounting From 2004, Professional 




an audit. Few specified 
exceptions exist, but only 
if pre-approved by the 
audit committee. Firms 
may provide non-auditing
services to a company if 
the services do not exceed 
5% of the total fees paid 
by the company to the 
auditor during the year.254 
Standards on Independence 
require the auditor to 
identify threats to
independence and
safeguards to be employed.  
Where non-audit services 
pose too great a risk to
independence, the provider 
of such services is 
prohibited from being 
involved in the audit.  
There are disclosure 
requirements on non-audit 
services and explanations 




Audit Waiting A registered public Since 2004, a professional
Period accounting firm may not 
audit a public company if 
a senior finance executive 
of the company was 
member of an audit firm is 
prohibited from becoming 
a director or other
responsible officer of the
253. Corporations Act, 2001, pt. 9.4B, § 1317G (1B) (Austl.). 
251. SOX, supra note 2, §§ 802 (criminal penalties for altering documents), 805
(sentencing guidelines), 807 (criminal penalties for defrauding shareholders). 
252. SOX, supra note 2, § 802. 
254. SOX, supra note 2, § 208; SEC Act, supra note 109, §§ 210, 240, 249, 274. 
255. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324CA–324CH (Austl.). 
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employed by the firm and 
that person participated in
the audit of the company 
during the preceding 
256year.
audited company within
two years of their departure
from the audit firm.257 
Audit Rotation The lead audit partner 
must be rotated every five 
258years.
Those with a significant 
role in an audit are to be
rotated every five years.259 
Audit Record Auditors must retain all Auditors must retain all 
Retention audit and review work
papers for at least
260seven years.
audit working papers for at
least seven years.261 
Auditor Influence An officer or director of a 
public company is 
prohibited from
fraudulently influencing 
or coercing any 
independent public
auditor that is performing 
an audit on the 
262company.
Since 2004, the 
Corporations Act states a 
general principal that there 
should be auditor
independence. Auditors are 
required to declare
annually to the board of
directors of an audited 
company that the auditor 
has maintained its 
independence as required
by legislation and 
professional standards. 
Financial relationships 
between the auditor and the 
audit client are restricted, 
and the auditor must 
identify threats to
independence and
safeguards to be 
employed.263
 256. SOX, supra note 2, § 206. 
257. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 324CI, 324CJ (Austl.). 
258. SOX, supra note 2, § 203. 
259. Corporations Act, 2001, § 324 DA (Austl.). 
260. SOX, supra note 2, § 103; SEC Act, supra note 109, § 210.2-06 (a). 
261. Corporations Act, 2001, § 307B (Austl.). 
262. SOX, supra note 2, § 303; SEC Act, supra note 109, § 240.13b2-2(b) (1), (b) 
(2), (2) (c).
263. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 307AC, 300(11B), 307C (Austl.).
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Accounting SOX created the Public In 2004, CLERP 9 
Oversight Company Accounting
Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), a five-member 
board independent of the
accounting profession and 
overseen by the SEC, to




responsibilities of the 
Financial Reporting 
Council to oversee the 
setting of auditing 
standards, advise on 
auditor independence,
monitor the adequacy of 
the systems and processes
used by audit firms to
assure audit independence, 
promote the teaching of 
professional and business
ethics, and monitor the 
adequacy of disciplinary 
procedures.265
 264. SOX, supra note 2, § 101. 
265. ASIC Act, supra note 151. 
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